"And I assure you
that we will defeat Boko Haram by the end of this year." This was the pledge made by Nigerian President Muhammdu Buhari to his
Beninese counterpart, Boni Yayi, during a gala dinner commemorating Benin's
independence during the summer of 2015.
It was a promise that
the Nigerian head of state would also reiterate to fellow Nigerians, who
eagerly waited for him to make good on his promise and act with the
decisiveness that Buhari had accused his predecessor, Goodluck Jonathan, of
lacking. Yet as 2015 drew to a close, the specter of Boko Haram loomed as large
as ever over Africa's most populous state.
Indeed, less than 48
hours after the Buhari regime announced that it had fulfilled its vow of
defeating the group, at least 50
people were killed in a wave of violence in Nigeria's
insurgent-embattled Borno and Adamawa states. Those skeptical of Boko Haram's
defeat were vindicated, those residing within the terrorists' deadly reach
continue to live in fear.
Nigeria's information
minister, however, downplayed the December 27 attacks and further reaffirmed that Boko Haram was on the precipice of being "wiped
out." Lai Mohammed claimed to local media that all
insurgent-held territory had been reclaimed and that Boko Haram no longer possessed
the operational capabilities to achieve its raison d'etre, the creation of a
"dawlah" -- or Islamic-state -- in north-eastern Nigeria.
The problem with
Mohammed's "impending demise" narrative is that it equated loss of
territory with defeat. Prior to Boko Haram's capture in July 2014 of Damboa,
the first Nigerian town to fall to the extremist sect, its near decade-long
insurgency had been characterized by traditional guerilla warfare. The group's
favoured modus operandi had been suicide bombings and hit-and-run raids, not
the capture and control of territory.
The acts of violence
which the Nigerian government has derided as indicative of Boko Haram's
weaknesses are actually the very mechanisms which have made it one of the -- if
not the -- deadliest
terrorist organizations in the world.
Apart from being
face-saving exercises, accounts of Boko Haram's imminent destruction may also
be an attempt by the Buhari regime to misdirect attention from the myriad
issues which have -- and continue to -- hamper its counter-insurgency strategy.
The foremost of these
is the failure of Nigeria and her Lake Chad neighbors to formulate a regionally
coordinated response to the insurgency. Although it originated as a grassroots
Nigerian organization, Boko Haram's ambitions and operations have become transnational
as it increasingly exported its insurgency across the border to Cameroon, Chad
and Niger.
While these countries
agreed to form a joint anti-Boko Haram task force in 2014, rumors of strained
diplomatic tensions, disagreements over the direction of operations and a lack
of financing have all seen the unit miss several deployment deadlines.
Despite an
intensification in anti-terrorism initiatives by the Nigerian military, the
failure by neighboring countries to respond in kind has afforded Boko Haram space in which to regroup, recruit
and re-energize its armed uprising against the Nigerian state.
Alleged
maladministration within the Nigerian military is another issue diluting the
efficacy of the country's counter-terrorism response. In June 2015, Amnesty
International released a damning report detailing alleged war crimes
committed by the Nigerian military in its counter-insurgency initiatives. These
included arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture and the
extrajudicial killings of thousands of Boko Haram suspects, according to the
Amnesty report.
Although both the
Nigerian presidency and military leadership promised to investigate these claims, it remains unclear as to
whether an steps have been made toward the inquiry.
If the clams are true,
then such actions may see the army not only lose the hearts and minds of local
communities, which are essential to any successful counter-insurgency
cooperation, but also aid Boko Haram in its radicalization and recruitment
process.
The arrest of a former
National Security Adviser has also highlighted how corruption has allegedly
influenced Nigeria's response to Boko Haram. Sambo Dasuki has been charged with embezzling military funds earmarked for the
fight against Boko Haram at a time when Nigerian soldiers complained about lack
of ammunition, fuel and even food while deployed in the field of battle. Dasuki has
denied the corruption charges. He remains in custody.
Although the arrest of
Dasuki and others demonstrates Buhari's commitment to fighting alleged
corruption, its systemic presence in Nigeria suggests that possible malfeasance
within the defense sector is unlikely to be remedied overnight. Transparency
International, which monitors corruption round the world,reported in 2014 that Nigeria scored only 27 out of 100 on
the corruption perception index. Buhari has made fighting Nigeria's official
corruption a key part of his presidency since he came to power in
2015.
A final consideration
is the impact that Boko Haram's pledge of allegiance to Islamic State in March
has had on the African
group's longevity. While the Nigerian government denounced the oath
of fidelity as being nothing more than superficial propaganda, the fact is we
know little about the ISIS model for expansion -- and even less about Boko
Haram's inner-workings -- to know definitively the implications of the pledge.
What we do know is
that Boko Haram has become the largest ISIS affiliate anywhere and has
increased its jihadist credentials within an area of sub-Saharan Africa where
the prevailing social, political and economic climate is seen as conducive to radicalization.
The inconvenient truth
is that Nigeria has not defeated Boko Haram but simply reversed the gains that
the terror group has scored against it. While territory has been recaptured
from rebel hands, innocent lives have, and continue, to be taken by it.
No victory can be
declared in this war until the day that the Nigerian government can secure both
land and human life from Boko Haram's deadly reach. Despite claims to the
contrary, it is a day which will now have to be ushered in with the dawn of a
new year.
0 Comments